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It has been disputed whether scalar implica-
tures (= SIs) arise globally or locally. Basi-
cally SIs should be global because they arise
by comparing strengths of whole alternative
statements. On the other hand, there are a lot
of examples in which local SIs are prefer-
able. Linguists like Chierchia (2002) and
Fox (2006) even claim that SIs arise by ap-
plying an operator to syntactic constituents
to get their stronger meanings. In this paper,
I claim that SIs are global and seemingly lo-
cal implicatures are effects of contexts on
global implicatures. Moreover, I will show
that no syntactic analyses work.
1 Introduction
Scalar implicatures (SIs) arise on the basis of the
maxim of quantity by Grice (1975):
(1) The maxim of quantity:
a. Make your contribution as informative
as is required (for the current purposes
of the exchange).
b. Do not make your contribution more
informative than is required.
It is the first maxim of quantity that is relevant to
SIs. When a stronger statement is relevant to the
context and a speaker utters a weaker statement, it
is implicated that the stronger statement is not true
in the speaker’s information state. Assuming that
the speaker is well-informed and that he knows the
stronger alternative is false, the hearer accepts the
implicature as true.
Grice did not explicate the precise procedure of
getting a SI. Horn (1972, 1989) suggested that a
SI arises by comparing a set of alternative state-
ments that arises by replacing a scalar term in the
original statement with a stronger scalar alterna-
tive expression in the language system. Behind
this idea lies the assumption that a set of scalar
terms, which is called a scalar set, is given in the
language system. Sauerland (2004) gives a more
precise procedure, within the Neo-Gricean tradi-
tion that a SI arises based on a set of scalar alter-
natives. He assumes that SIs have an epistemic
status, following Gazdar (1979), but deviates from
his idea by assuming that the maxim of quantity
gives rise to only uncertainty inferences, which he
calls primary implicatures. Primary implicatures
have the form of ‘K’, in which K means ‘know’
and is a stronger alternative sentence of the orig-
inal utterance. The hearer tentatively strengthens
each of the primary implicature of the form ‘K’.
If the stronger implicature is compatible with the
meaning of the statement and all the primary im-
plicatures, it gets the status of a SI, which he calls
a secondary implicature.
His idea is illustrated in the following:
(2) John broke some glasses.
(3) a. ScalAlt(some) = {all, many, some}
b. ScalAlt(John broke some glasses) =
{John broke all glasses,
John broke many glasses,
John broke some glasses}
c. (2) primarily implicates the following:
¬K(John broke all glasses)
¬K(John broke many glasses)
d. secondary implicatures:
K¬(John broke {all, many} glasses)
The use of some yields a stronger statement φ (=
‘John broke {all, many} glasses’) and the primary
implicature is ¬Kφ, which can be strengthened
into ¬Kφ since it is compatible with the statement
itself plus all the primary implicatures.
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Neo-Griceans naturally accepted that SIs are
calculated from a whole statement. In this re-
spect, they can be called globalists. SIs are infer-
ences based on the maxim of quantity by Grice
(1975). Implicatures are supposed to be calcu-
lated from utterances, which are always dealt with
as a whole. This implies that SIs only arise from
stronger statements than the original statement.
However, linguists like Chierchia (2002) claim
that implicatures are included in the meaning of
a statement, as part of the strengthened mean-
ing (= the literal meaning plus its implicatures)
of a CHUNK of a statement as a scope-site of
a scalar expression, in the process of composi-
tional semantic interpretation, following Krifka
(1995), and the strengthened meaning of the sen-
tence chunk is combined with the meaning of the
rest of the sentence. The plain meaning of an ex-
pression α is represented as [[α]] and the implica-
ture is ¬S(αALT ), where S(αALT ) is the weakest
alternative of α that entails α. Thus the strength-
ened meaning of α is the conjunction of the two
meanings: [[α]] ∧ ¬S(αALT ), which entails other
strengthened meanings from the stronger alterna-
tives of α. Chierchia introduces the negation oper-
ator to get a stronger meaning. For the same pur-
pose, Fox (2006) instead introduces the exhaustiv-
ity (exh, hereafter) operator. They can be called
localists.
Their analysis is illustrated in the following:
(4) Mary believes that John broke some
glasses.
(5) a. LF: Mary believes that [[some
glasses]i [John broke ti]]
b. [[[[some glasses]i [John broke ti]]]] =
some’(student’)(λx.broke’(j,x))
c. [[[[some glasses]i [John broke ti]]]]S
= some’(student’)(λx.broke’(j,x)) ∧




d. [[(4)]]S = believes’(m,
ˆ(some’(student’)(λx.broke’(j,x)) ∧
¬many’(student’)(x.broke’(j,x))))
It is assumed that the quantifier some glasses is
Quantifier-raised witin the complement clause of
the propositional attitude verb believes. And a
SI from the use of some is calculated when the
strengthened meaning of the complement clause is
obtained in (5c). The strengthened meaning of the
complement clause is the conjunction of the plain
meaning and a SI of the clause, the latter of which
is expressed as ¬S(φALT ), where φ is the comple-
ment clause [some glasses [John broke ti]]. We
are assuming that the weakest stronger alternative
of some is many. The alternative meanings are
derived in a similar way to the alternative seman-
tics by Rooth (1985) for focus. The strengthened
meaning of the complement clause is combined
with the meaning of the rest of the sentence, as
in (5d).
Localists’ approaches may look more system-
atic, manageable and more constrained than glob-
alists’, because they are based on syntactic struc-
tures and calculation of SIs is precisely defined.
However, one theoretically serious problem with
localists is that, as Horn (1989) pointed out, SIs do
not arise within downward entailing contexts and
that SIs are based on strengths of statements as a
whole. Even if they calculate SIs locally, they have
to check whether an alternative involved in the
calculation makes the whole sentence a stronger
statement to see if it really leads to a valid SI. In
this respect, SIs are inherently global.
Empirically, actual data do not take part with
either of the two positions. Consider the following
examples:
(6) Some students who drank beer or wine
were allowed to drive.
a. Some students who drank beer or
wine, but NOT both, were allowed to
drive.
b. NOT[some students who drank both
were allowed to drive]
(= No students who drank both were
allowed to drive.)
(7) Every linguistics student at MIT has read
LGB or Syntactic Structures. (Modified
from Sauerland 2004, (58))
a. NOT[Every linguistics student at MIT
has read LGB and Syntactic Struc-
tures]
b. Every linguistics student at MIT
NOT[has read LGB and Syntactic
Structures]
(= No linguistics students at MIT have
read LGB and Syntactic Structures.)
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In (6), it is plausible that no students who drank
both beer and wine were allowed to drive, which
is calculated by negating the whole stronger alter-
native. In (7), a linguist at MIT is likely to have
read one of the two books, and the global SI is
more likely. On the other hand, the following two
examples show the opposite:
(8) Some students who watched TV or played
games failed math.
a. Some students who watched TV or
played games, but not did both, failed
maths. (conveyed)
b. NOT[Some students who watched
TV and played games failed maths]
(global SI)
(9) Every student wrote a paper or made a
classroom presentation.
a. Every student wrote a paper or made a
classroom presentation but did not do
both.
b. NOT(every student wrote a paper and
made a classroom presentation)
In (8), it is more likely that a student who watched
TV and played games failed math. For this reason
the global SI that no students who watched TV and
played games failed math is not acceptable. Sim-
ilarly, in (9), if either of the two requirements is
sufficient to get a grade, it is more plausible to as-
sume that no students satisfied both requirements.
This corresponds to the local SI. Thus we do not
get the global SI that not every student did both.
Then we could take a position in which we
exploit both ways of calculation of SIs. But if
we cannot provide clear criteria for when we get
global SIs and when we get local ones, it is not
an explanation at all. Moreover, if syntactic struc-
tures are not what we directly deal with in calcu-
lating SIs, we cannot choose a localistic approach
anyway. In this paper I will show that calculation
of SIs needs more fine-grained structures than syn-
tactic structures. And I will also show that local
SIs are contextual effects on global SIs.
2 SIs corresponding to no syntactic
constituents
2.1 SIs embedded in syntatic structures
In a syntactic analysis the operator that applies to
a constituent which yields a SI is of semantic type
of a proposition. In Chierchia (2002), the negation
operator applies to a scope site of a scalar expres-
sion. A scope site has a semantic type of a propo-
sition, or a clause, in more common terms. In Fox
(2006), exh applies to a constituent that has the
semantic type of a proposition and takes both the
meaning of the constituent as a proposition and a
set of alternative propositions to that, as its argu-
ments. However, there are cases where we can get
a SI from a NP:
(10) Some boys who read some of the books
passed the test.
From the use of some of the books a global ap-
proach predicts the SI that no boys who read all of
the books passed the test, which is implausible. A
local approach predicts that the sentence conveys
the meaning that some boys who read some, but
not all, of the books passed the test. This does not
exclude the possibility that some other boys who
read all of the books passed the test. The original
statement conveys the meaing that reading some
of the books was sufficient to pass the test. This
indicates that the local SI is not plausible, either.
A more plausible SI can be one of the following:
(11) a. No boys read all of the books.
b. The boys who passed the test did not
read all of the books.
The two possible SIs correspond to the follow-
ing structures:
(12) a. some boys who read some of the
books
b. Some boys who passed the test read
some of the books.
The first SI corresponds to the NP some boys
who read some of the books, and the second corre-
sponds to a quite different sentence than the origi-
nal. Moreover, the second SI anaphorically refers
to the boys who passed the test, which does not
have a corresponding constituent in the original
sentence.
The two implicatures in (11) do not come from
any syntactic constituent of semantic type of a
proposition. This shows that SIs depend on con-
tents, not on structures. To deal with contents of
statements, we need to deal with semantic repre-
sentations, instead of syntactic structures. Since
SIs do not depend on syntactic structures, they are
not calculated compositionally. They should be
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calculated after the statement is interpreted into a
semantic representation.
Since we do not depend on syntactic structures,
we will have to resort to a global approach. On
the other hand, we have seen some SIs that could
be calculated by a localistic approach. In order
for a SI to be like a local SI, a SI has to have the
effect of being embedded even if we calculate it
after we finish interpreting the statement. One way
to make such an effect is to deal with semantic
representations in dynamic semantics:
(13) Mary met a doctor. He lived near Brook-
lyn.
' Mary met a doctor who lived near
Brooklyn.
Even though the pronoun he is used in a new sen-
tence, the whole text seems to have the meaning
of a sentence in which the second sentence is em-
bedded in a relative clause in the first sentence.
A similar effect can be expected when a SI of a
statement is calculated after the statement is inter-
preted:
(14) Some boys who read some of the books
passed the test. They did not read all of
the books.
' Some boys who read some of the books,
but did not read all of them, passed the
test.
In this example, the pronoun they refers to the boys
who read some of the books and passed the test.
The second sentence is added after the first state-
ment is finished and it is taken to be a SI of the
first sentence. The effect is the same as the sen-
tence in which the SI is embedded in the relative
clause of the statement.1 This is one way of get-
ting the effect of a local SI from a global SI. Note
that this effect comes from anaphora across sen-
tences in dynamic semantics.
2.2 SIs not based on scalar terms
Horn (1972, 1989) proposed a set of scalar terms
to capture SIs. However, there are scales that are
1It is sometimes pointed out that there is a subtle differ-
ence between the two sentences, but the effect is clearly what
we need. And even if we admit the difference, a more intu-
itively correct meaning is obtained by the first one rather than
the one in which the SI is embedded. When the SI is em-
bedded in the relative clause, there is a possibility that some
other boys who read all of the books passed the test. This
possibility is not necessarily legitimate.
not based on scalar terms or any explicit expres-
sions. This can be observed in examples like (6–
9). Consider the pair of (6) and (8). When a
student who drank beer or wine was allowed to
drive, a student who drank both beer and wine is
not likely to have been allowed to drive. Drinking
either beer or wine is the upper limit for being al-
lowed to drive. A SI that is compatible with this
background knowledge survives, and a SI that is
not dies. In (8), on the other hand, when a student
who watched TV or played games failed math, a
student who did both is more likely to fail math.
Watching TV or playing games is understood as
the lower limit for failing math. The difference
between (6) and (8) lies in the opposite direction-
ality of the scalar likelihood, independently of the
semantic strengths of alternatives.
The scalarity of likelihood cannot be captured
by any syntactic constituent and it is not a matter
of semantics either. This can be captured by or-
dering possible worlds according to some knowl-
edge about likelihood of states of affairs. SIs gen-
erally have the effect of strengthening the original
statement. If the strengthening goes in the oppo-
site direction to the scalar likelihood, the SI is re-
jected. In (8) the global SI is that no students who
watched TV and played games failed math, which
is less likely than the original sentence. Therefore
it is rejected. We can get a weaker SI than this. At
the moment I will call it a local SI, but I will show
below that it is also a global SI. In (6), the global
SI that no students who drank both beer and wine
were allowed to drive is more likely than the orig-
inal statement. And it is accepted. Note that this
is a case where a semantic scalarity is in opposite
direction to a pragmatic likelihood.
3 Global SIs with the effect of local SIs
As we have seen, sometimes we get global SIs and
other times we get local SIs. It is not just that
whether a global or local SI is plausible is deter-
mined by a context, but that a global SI has the
effect of a local SI in a certain context. This is
what I am going to show in this section.
3.1 Disjunction structures and SIs
As I said in the introduction, Saulerland (2004) as-
sumes that the scalar alternatives of or is {and,
L, R, or}. When a disjunct includes a scalar ex-
pression and the latter is replaced with a stronger
alternative, the disjunct itself becomes a stronger
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alternative and its stronger alternative is also an al-
ternative of the whole statement, as follows:
(15) John spilt wine or broke some glasses. (=
p)
(16) a. ScalAlt(p) = {John spilt wine and
broke all glasses, John spilt wine and
broke some glasses, John spilt wine,
John broke all glasses, John broke
some glasses, p}
The assumption of the operators L and R has the
effect of projecting a local implicature from each
disjunct into the main context. Thus the statement
implicates the following:
(17) ¬(John spilt wine and broke all glasses)
¬(John spilt wine and broke some glasses)
¬(John broke all glasses)
Here the SI that John did not break all glasses
arises from a stronger alternative of the second dis-
junct. This is a case where the disjunction struc-
ture is transparent for the projection of a SI.
However, it does not have to be the case. There
are cases where a stronger alternative of a disjunct
yields only a local SI:
(18) a. John broke all or some glasses.
b. John wanted hot or at least warm wa-
ter.
c. John won the lottery or made some
easy money.
In these examples, the use of the second disjuncts
implicates that the first disjuncts do not hold. Take
the first example. If the second disjunct is under-
stood as meaning John broke some (or all) glasses,
the use of the disjunction operator is infelicitous.
For this reason, the second disjunct has to mean
that John broke some but not all glasses, and this
has to be a local implicature. Otherwise it would
contradict the first disjunct:
(19) #John broke all or some glasses. He did
not break all glasses.
The discourse is not inconsistent because we could
conclude that John broke only some of the glasses.
However, the discourse is incoherent. A speaker
who can truly assert the second sentence would
not utter the first sentence.2 We can say the same
thing about the other two examples.
2A simple way of distinguishing coherence and consis-
tency is that a discourse is coherent if it is asserted by the
One thing in common among the three exam-
ples is that the two disjuncts are not independent
of each other. This contextual information makes
the implicatures from the second disjuncts stay in
the second disjuncts, making them local implica-
tures. However, contextual information should be
put aside when we discuss the way that SIs are cal-
culated. As I said, we can always assume global
SIs and the meanings of local SIs are derived by
the help of contextual information.
I propose that the meaning of a statement and
its implicatures are captured by their informational
effects on the current information state. Suppose
that φ is uttered in the current information state
and changes it into s′. Then a (global) SI ¬ψ (,
where ψ asymmetrically entails φ,) is added to s′
and changes it into s′′. Then the net effect of ψ
on s′ is the set of possible worlds eliminated by
¬ψ, i.e., (s′\(s′ + ψ), where “\” is a set minus).
This is the actual effect of the SI on the current
information state.
(20) s + φ = s′
s′ + ¬ψ = s′′
(21) net effect of ¬ψ = s′\(s′+¬ψ)
= s′\(s′\(s′+ψ)) = s′+ψ
The composition of the set of the possible
worlds determines the actual SI. Consider (15)
first. With the information state s, since the two
disjuncts are independent of each other, we can as-
sume that s+(15) includes the following three sets
of possible worlds:
(22) a. a set of possible worlds in which John
only spilt wine
b. a set of possible worlds in which John
only broke some glasses
c. a set of possible worlds in which John
did both
In this context, the SI from some has the following
effect on the information state, following (21):
(23) (s+(15))\(s+(15)+SIsome)
= s+(15)∩{w| John spilt wine or broke
many/all glasses}
same speaker, but a discourse is consistent if it does not lead
to the absurd information state if uttered by different speak-
ers. In the example at hand, if the two sentences are uttered
by two different speakers, it does not lead to the absurt infor-




= s+(15)∩{w| John broke many/all
glasses}
The net effect of the use of some is what we get by
updating s+(15) with a stronger alternative. But
(15) and the stronger alternative share the possible
worlds in which the first disjunct holds. Therefore
the net effect of the stronger alternative is the same
as the effect of the second disjunct. Since the two
disjuncts are independent of each other, the set of
possible worlds eliminated by the global SI con-
sists of those in which John only broke many/all
glasses and those in which John both spilt wine
and broke many/all glasses. They are possible
worlds in which the second disjunct of the stronger
alternative holds, regardless of whether the first
disjunct holds. That is, the SI has the overall effect
on the information state, regardless of whether the
first disjunct holds or not. Thus the SI has the ef-
fect of a global SI, even though the net effect only
comes from the second disjunct of the stronger al-
ternative.
Next, consider (18.a), where a SI from one dis-
junct does not project. In a given context, the two
disjuncts are not independent of each other, but
there is a subset relation:
(24) a. a set of possible worlds in which John
broke all glasses
b. a set of possible worlds in which John
broke some glasses (and possibly all)
c. (a) ⊆ (b)
In this situation, the net effect of the SI from the
use of some is the following:
(25) s′ = s + “John broke all or some glasses”
(26) the net effect of “¬(John broke all or
many/all glasses)”
= s′+John broke all or many/all glasses
= s′∩{w| John broke all or many (but not
some) glasses in w}
Since the first disjunct is shared by the two alter-
natives, the net effect is determined by the second
disjunct. Therefore the SI has the effect that John
broke many (but not some) glasses. However, this
does not have the overall effect on the current in-
formation state, because the two disjuncts are not
independent of each other. If it did, the speaker
would simply say that John broke some glasses.
Then there would be no possible worlds in which
John broke all glasses. There should be some
possible worlds in s′ that John broke all glasses.3
Then the net effect of the SI only applies to the
possible worlds in which John did not break all
glasses. That is, it eliminates possible worlds in
which John broke not all but more than just some
glasses. This is the way the global SI has the effect
of a local implicature.
3.2 Other cases of local SIs
In a conditional, the antecedent clause and the
consequent clause are not independent of each
other. In normal cases, a SI from the consequent
clause is not supposed to have the effect of a local
SI. This can be explained easily:
(27) s + “if φ, then ψ” = s+[¬φ ∨ ψ]4
(28) For a stronger alternative ψ′ of ψ, the net
effect of the global SI
= s′+[if φ, then ψ′]
= s+[¬φ ∨ ψ] + [¬φ ∨ ψ′]
= s+[[¬φ ∨ ψ] ∧ [¬φ ∨ ψ′]]
= s+[¬φ ∨ [ψ ∧ ψ′]]
= s+[¬φ ∨ ψ′]
= s+ [if φ, then ψ′]
The net effect of the global SI ¬(if φ, then ψ′) is
limited to the possible worlds in which φ hold.
This is the effect of restricting the SI to the con-
sequent clause. Thus the global SI has the effect
of a local SI.
On the other hand, when the antecedent clause
is trivially satisfied in the current information
state, a global SI has a overall effect.
(29) If you want to, you may have some apples.
In the given context, it is likely that the hearer
wants to have some apples. In this context, the an-
3This is the effect of the felicity condition that each dis-
junct should make a non-trivial meaning contribution to the
meaning of a whole sentence. This is beyond the scope of
this paper.
4The way a sentence is interpreted has to be defined so
that anaphoric dependency relations can be captured. For this
purpose, a conditional sentence has to be interpreted as fol-
lows:
i. s + “if φ, then ψ” = s\((s+φ)\(s+φ+ψ)) = s′
That is, a pronoun in the antecedent clause can refer to some-
thing in the main context, and a pronoun in the consequent
clause can refer to something in the main context or the an-
tecedent clause. We can assume this rule, but it would lead
to a more complex calculation. For convenience’s sake, I as-
sume a propositional logic in which a conditional is equiva-
lent to the disjunction of the negation of the antecedent clause
and the consequent clause.
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tecedent clause is trivially satisfied in the current
information state and thus the antecedent clause
does not change the current information state. The
conditional does not have the effect of a condi-
tional but the consequent clause. Therefore the
(global) SI from the use of some in the consequent
clause affects the current information state directly
and has the effect of a global SI:
(30) s + “you want to have some apples” = s
s + “If you want to, you may have some
apples”
= s\((s+“you want to have some
apples”)\(s+ “you want to have some
apples”+“you may have some apples”))
= s\(s\(s+“you may have some apples”))
= s+“you may have some apples”
As shown above, the conditional has the same
meaning as the consequent clause, which makes
a SI from the consequent clause a global effect on
the current information state.
In Chierchia (2002), it is claimed that a scalar
expression in a propositional attitude context
yields a local SI. This is not explained by the
mechanism I have used so far.
(31) Mary believes that John broke some
glasses.
+> Mary believes that John did not broke
all glasses.
(32) s + Mary believes that John broke some
glasses
= {w∈s| for every w′ in Dox(m,w), John
broke some glasses in w′} = s′
(33) net effect of “¬(Mary believes that John
broke many/all glasses)” =
s′\(s′+“Mary believes that John broke
many/all glasses”)
= {w∈s| for every w′ in Dox(m,w), John
broke some glasses in w′, there are some
possible worlds w′′ in Dox(m,w) such that
John did not broke many/all glasses in w′′}
= It is not the case that Mary believes John
broke many/all glasses.
6= Mary believes John did not break
many/all glasses.
The SI that it is not the case that Mary believes
John broke many/all glasses does not mean that
Mary believes John did not break many/all glasses.
But intuitively we seem to get the latter inference.
However, it is not reliable to discuss belief con-
texts and draw a conclusion. When we talk about
Mary’s belief, we can think of Mary’s statements
the speaker heard, and they are likely to yield SIs,
which are also taken to be part of Mary’s belief
even in the speaker’s report. Another reason for
not relying on discussions of belief contexts is that
a belief operator is not generally accepted as a
universal quantifier over doxastic alternatives. It
seems to be due to the lack of an existential coun-
terpart.
Consider an epistemic unviersal quantifier must
and a obligation operator:
(34) John must have broken some glasses.
+> John may not have broken all glasses.
+/> John cannot have broken all glasses.
(35) John must read some of the books.
+> John does not have to read all of the
book.
+/> John must not read all of the books.
Considering the fact that the deontic operator be-
haves just the way we expected it to, we cannot
claim that SIs should be local. On the other hand,
epistemic operators tend to allow stronger SIs than
what is predicted by the theory. For some reason,
an epistemic operator tends to have wide scope,
even over the operator introduced to calculate a
SI.
In this section, I have shown that the actual ef-
fect of a SI on the current information state can be
captured by dealing with possible worlds, rather
than expressions. It allows us to accout for how
global SIs get the effects of local GIs. This allows
us to dispense with local SIs. In the previous sec-
tion, I also showed that SIs from syntactically em-
bedded can have global effects and that they can be
dealt with in dynamic semantics. Dynamic sean-
tics assumes that the meaning of a sentence is a
context change potential which takes an informa-
tion state as an input and yields an updated infor-
mation state by adding the information conveyed
by the sentence to the input information state. In
the next section, I will propose a new analysis re-
flecting the two necessary components to account
for SIs and their observations.
4 SIs in dynamic semantics
4.1 Basics of dynamic semantics
In this paper, I will use a (slightly modified)
DRT (discourse representation theory) in repre-
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senting the meaning of a sentence for various rea-
sons. First, it allows us to be able to manage
meanings as representations. Second, it provides
more fine-grained chunks of meanings than the
classical predicate logic or syntactic structures,
which allows us to account for some SIs which do
not correspond to a syntactic constituent. Third,
anaphoric relationships are easily captured, which
is necessary to account for the effect of being em-
bedded of a SI even when it is added to the DRS
(discourse representation structure) after the sen-
tence is interpreted. A variable in a SI can be free
or bound by a variable in the previous DRS, and
the mechanism allows us to get various SIs, de-
pending on whether variables in a stronger alter-
native statement are free or bound by the variables
in the original statement. Let’s see how it works.
Anaphoric relations are restricted by accessibil-
ity paths given by the DRT. The accessibility paths
can be restricted as follows:
(36) a. A DRS is a pair of a set of variables
and a set of conditions on the vari-
ables, <var, con>.
b. A variable in (i) is accessible for a
variable in (ii), but a variable in (ii)
is not accessible for a variable in (iii),





A variable newly introduced in a DRS is acces-
sible for any variable in the conditions in it. In
a disjunction structure, a variable in one disjunct
is not accessible to a variable in another disjunct.
In a conditional, a variable introduced in the an-
tecedent clause is accessible for a variable in the
consequent clause, but not vice versa.
On the other hand, we will assume an infor-
mation state with respect to which a DRS is in-
terpreted. This is necessary to account for cases
where a global SI has the effect of a local SI.
(37) An information state is a set of pairs of a
possible world w and an assignment g.
(38) A set of variables var includes a variable v
for possible worlds.
(39) A DRS is interpreted with respect to a
model <W, D, F, G>, where W is a set
of possible worlds, D a set of individuals,
F an interpretation function of constants,
and G a set of assignment functions.
(40) A DRS <var, con> is supported in an
information state s iff for every member
<w,g> in s, {<w, g∪var>} supports ev-
ery condition in con.
(41) {<w,g>} supports Pv(x) iff g(v)=w and
g(x) ∈ F(P)(w)
(42) {<w,g>} supports < var(i), con(i)> ∨
<var(ii), con(ii)> iff <w, g∪var(i)> sup-
ports every condition in con(i) or <w,
g∪var(ii)> supports every condition in
con(ii).
(43) {<w,g>} supports < var(i), con(i)> ⇒
<var(ii), con(ii)> iff <w, g∪var(i)> does
not support every condition in con(i)
or <w, g∪var(i)∪var(ii)> supports every
condition in con(ii).
An information state is a set of pairs of a possi-
ble world and an assignment. To interpret a DRS
with respect to possible worlds, I introduce a vari-
able for possible worlds in DRSs. This is a devi-
ation from the standard DRS, in which each DRS
is interpreted with respect to a model. In this pa-
per, possible worlds are included in a model. This
makes a DRS more like a semantic representa-
tion. This would yield no problems. After a DRS
is interpreted, we get an information state which
supports the DRS. We only deal with information
states we get after a statement is interpreted, so we
do not need dynamic interpretation rules. Instead,
we need support conditions. A DRS is supported
by an information state iff each pair of a possible
world and an assignment supports each condition
in the DRS. A disjunction structure is supported by
a pair of a world and an assignment iff one of the
disjuncts is supported by the pair. A conditional is
dealt with like a disjunction of the negation of the
antecedent clause and the consequent clause.
I do not have to follow the Neo-Gricean tra-
dition, because it is assumed that a SI arises
by comparing the meanings of alternative state-
ments. However, scalar alternatives make them-
selves more salient than others. In this respect it
does not do any harm to assume a set of scalar al-
ternatives. But it is not necessary to assume them.
4.2 SIs from non-clauses
Now we can deal with cases where SIs arise from
some non-clause constituents. Such cases are
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problematic with localistic approaches. One ex-
ample is given in (10), which is given here again.
It is interpreted into a DRS as follows:
(10) Some boys who read some of the books
passed the test.
(44)







This is just the interpretation of (10), but I will
assume that it is the first sentence and constitutes
the main DRS. Suppose that this is supported in
an information state s. In the result information
state, we calculate a SI from the use of some of the
books. We get a global SI by negating a stronger
alternative of the whole statement:
(45) ¬




l ∈ Z′ ⇒ readv(X′,l)
testv(k′)
passedv(X′,k′)
This is embedded in the main DRS and we have
to see if some variables in it can be bound in the
main DRS:
(46)












l ∈ Z′ ⇒ readv(X′,l)
testv(k′)
passedv(X′,k′)
The process is quite similar to the presupposi-
tion projection in van der Sandt (1992). Since
we are talking about the same possible world, v
is bound by the same variable in the matrix DRS.
Variables like Z′ and k′ are introduced by presup-
positions and are supposed to be bound by Z and
k respectively. Therefore conditions on them are
not negated:5
(45′)











l ∈ Z ⇒ readv(X′,l)
passedv(X′,k)
This leads to the following SIs:
(47) a. No boys read all of them(= the books)
and passed it(= the test).
b. No boys read all of them(= the books).
All conditions considered, we get (47a) as a SI,
but intuitively it is not plausible. When some boys
who read only some of the books passed the test, a
boy who read all of the books is more likely to pass
the test. And we already know some boys passed
the test. Thus we can ignore the last condition in
the DRS:
(45′′)











l ∈ Z ⇒ readv(X′,l)
Here comes in the more fine-grainedness of a
DRS. Notice that what was in the relative clause in
the sentence is not embedded in the DRS but put
in the main DRS. Moreover, each condition can be
5We are talking about the actual world, and we do not
assume a new variable for possible worlds.
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freely considered or ignored in calculating SIs to
get a contextually relevant SI.
In my analysis, since a SI is calculated after the
sentence is interpreted, all infomation in the sen-
tence can be considered to be presuppositions, fol-
lowing Stalnaker (1978, 2006). Thus even X′ can
be bound by X in the main DRS.
(45′′′)








l ∈ Z ⇒ readv(X,l)
(They (= some boys who read some of
the books) did not read all of them (= the
books))
Even though the SI is calculated separately from
the original sentence, it gives rise to the effect of
embedding the SI in the relative clause of the orig-
inal sentence as in the following:
(48) Some boys who read some of the books,
but not all of them, passed the test.
It is just a coincidence that the SI goes into the
relative clause. A SI can go anywhere in the
main DRS, but syntactically it can be realized in
a relative clause or in the restrictor or the nuclear
scope of a quantifier, depending on where a rele-
vant scalar expression occurs in the sentence.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I claim that SIs are always global
and that SIs are calculated in the framework of dy-
namic semantics. I used the DRT as a semantic
tool, but my analyses does not rely on a particu-
lar framework. Any dynamic semantics will do.
I have shown that global SIs can have the effect
of local SIs in some contexts. This effect is ob-
tained in various ways. First, a global SI can get
the effect of being embedded in a purely syntac-
tic island, and this is possible due to the dynamic
binding. Another way in which a global SI can
get the effect of a local is the role that a context
plays. This is not a matter of structure but a matter
of information contained in an information state.
A third factor is background knowledge. Back-
ground knowledge determines the scalarity of like-
lihood of states of affairs. This is a pragmatic mat-
ter. Hence it is not captured by the semantic order-
ing of scalar terms.
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